The fact that Descartes� most infamous declarations figure prominently in every physiology textbook is a testament to the importance of the issues he addresses.
However, the same textbooks unanimously declare this to be an outdated idea, in line with the prevailing modern view that the complexity of the nervous system (and possibly the rest of the body) provides sufficient explanation in physiological terms to account for the mystery of
misconceptions (at least, they�re believed to be misconceptions at the moment) that have arisen from Descartes� thought
�animal spirits�
pineal glands
and the Myth of Double Transduction
define indivisible
descartes� problem lies in explaining the inherent, unavoidable and essential interactions � arguably, these are the very most primitive of all � subjectivity is by definition what we feel, what gives us a sense of existence, and most powerfully conveys the sense of substrate, the �us� underlying that which makes us up
what constitutes �mind� has changed since Descartes was writing. doctors have been able to give a very crude degree of sight back to a now-blind man, by providing neural signals (inputted at how high a level? retina � cortex?) which he literally �sees� as basic contours. this perhaps closes the question of whether physiology can adequately explain sensory input as continual processing of signals received from the receptors. similar certainty can be attained for the motor system, by stimulating areas of a topographical map of the body in the (primary?) motor cortex, leading to stimulation of the respective muscle.
homonculus in a cartesian theatre with a very complicated joystick
there is something �unified� about mind, or at least our minds � that is to say, we feel as though we are one, an �I�, a single consciousness. yet, we are in fact 10 to the 11 irritable cells, or to put it another way, 10 to the 15 connections between them, or to put it yet another way, a flux of pulses (action potentials) along these neural pathways. the �higher-order thought� theory of consciousness limits the definition by granting �consciousness� to a mental state when it is able to consider itself as the object of its own thought (report a thought, rather than an expression of a thought (cf Hume�s �simple ideas�)) � can this be done by something indivisible. on the other hand (now fighting against the materialists), if our consciousness/mind is simply (built up of) the particular arrangement and state of the particular neurons firing at any given point in time (cf dispositions in Damasio), then how can a network consider itself? how can the bank of neurons configure themselves to form a representation of themselves/their own state? this problem does however, assume that it is the entirety of the network which is being taken into account � in fact, it would make far more sense if it were only certain bits, the final highest-level sections. after all, why include the firing of low-level neurons like the bipolar neurons stimulated by the retinal cells, when we have evolved to incorporate so much processing into their inputs. by the time these signals reach the cortices, they are barely recognisable as the same signal � in fact, the brain has coded and compressed and extracted from the original signal to form a reconstructed version � this is even further from the original by the time the �perceptual idea� has become a �recalled idea�, as well as less vivid. the point is, that only the results of the processing need be accessible to consciousness (but then, once again, we�re moving away from the mind as being indivisible). � un/non-conscious thoughts (the somatic marker and the gut feeling) � all make things difficult for the �perfect transparency of mind�
can a network be �conscious� � would the �mental lights still be out�, with all these telegraph poles linked together so intricately and carefully, but no one there to listen to what�s being said? no one at home. the homonculus, in other words. his point is that though a dog�s conception of cat may be extensionally the same as ours, it cannot consider its concept. languageless animal has no way of consdering cat or snow �in itself� or �in general�. �no way of wresting concepts from their conceptionist nests and manipulating them�, of voicing the polar bear�s implicit/procedural snow-how (wieldable concepts).
virtual architecture
is HOT recursive � is an HOT about an HOT third-order?
if we were to accept that the subjective unified phenomenon of consciousness is just the state of firing of a network of neurons, then obviously the bank of neurons, like the atoms in the corporeal world, can be separated from each other - but this is a spurious objection � the actual �mind� that they form as a collective would be unified, or would it? what happens to it if you cut one of its neurons out of the loop? mind definitely becomes divisible if we can separate the neurons into separate systems and sub-systems
what if we weren't in fact a unified indivisible entity (/Cartesian theatre), as modern theorists are considering � what if our single consciousness was built instead from a number of areas/modules, with their separate representations being somehow united (by glue rather than a homunculus) or brought together in time, would we still have self?
as we learn more about the activity of the brain, the ideas of Descartes� mind start to seem as simplified as his ideas of the body. perhaps the simplest demonstration of a somehow parallel as opposed to serial mind (is serialness actually necessary for a unified mind?) is the working memory � the fact that we can hold more than one idea in our head (but can we?) would seem to imply different areas working together. certainly it seems that we rely on the �sketchbook� of our working memory with which to think in the present � to hold separate concepts in our head, or at least juggle them within the window/slice (larger than an instant � need for temporal summation (like a synapse) rather than living purely in the present (like the cloud of super-positions so that an atom exists probably around about roughly here)) of time so that we appear to hold them all in consciousness at once (time-sharing, giving the appearance of multi-tasking like a computer).
ecoic memory pre-working for senses info � much filtering between memory modules � consciousness<->memory
seems to be something different between a body�s properties (basically just extension) being accidental (i.e. it�s configuration subject to change over time) and a mind having different thoughts � what are a mind�s properties � indivisibility/inextensibility and the capacity to have thought/to think � I suppose that Descartes would argue that its accidentalness stems from this thought/thinking changing over time, just as extension (the property of extension, anyway) morphs and alters � but somehow thought isn't a malleable, morphing plenum with strict delineations. which raises a question about whether there exists vacuum in the body-dimension, whether there can be nothingness in the corporeal world. but descartes says that nothingness has no properties, certainly not extension. but it does, since what occupies the gaps between atoms � this is perhaps too topical a question for philosophy or even modern physics to answer at the moment, but it certainly seems that thought itself is not indivisible. it must be, because Descartes talks of individual thoughts (mind you, he also talks about individual, separate bodies � is that relevant?) if so, this would seem to require some sort of mental membrane to sort out his own from others�/not-his-own thoughts. how does the mind encompass new thoughts if it is indivisible? is it something paradoxical like the universe: finite, but boundless � anyway, thought seems to be more of a disparate set of elements, much like the discrete combinatorial nature of language comprised of its separate words � collectively, they shift, re-order, even re-combine and flow from one another. the same word/thought can exist/be uttered/thought in different places/by diff people, but still be one�s own � then is thought, language? certainly not according to Damasio, who states that the subtle manipulation of the images in our mind (he uses the term, �images� to comprise the whole spectrum of sense modalities, substituting the more appropriate term, �representations� also) is thought. does this settle whether thought, like matter,
is the mind thought, or does the mind think? is the body extension, or does it extend? it seems uncertain now whether there is any analogue between the two that can be made, at least not as a parallel.
the debate now centres around the seat of consciousness, since these sensory inputs and motivational mechanisms seem to impinge on us so vividly and in a non-intellectual sense. by the same token, the problematic area with regard to mind � body concerns our volition, the step �before� the firing of cells in the motor cortex. the question is whether there is any sense in attempting to understand the subjective phenomena of volition as a cause of rather than a manifestation of the neuronal firing in the cortex which travels down the spinal cord and, relayed by synapses, directly causes the muscular contraction.
motivational mechanisms and emotion
reason and the decision-making process
finally: consciousness and action
the consc thoughts are simply those which have lasted long enough and acquired enough influence in the competition against all the other subconscious thinking going on
Dennett says that the main thing that sets up apart is that we can imagine, provide our own internally-grown mental stimulation, work on concepts held in working memory
k�r�s monkeys may/may not have been able to cognitively solve the problem of the stacked boxes or whatever (tell the story about the monkey with its hand trapped in the small hole), but could they summon a mental image � it seems likely that they were doing it by trial and error rather than through concerted/deliberate manipulation of a mental representation of their surroundings. dennett regards the question of the chimps� abilities in this regard as being one of how their minds are put together, rather than simply size or number of neurons. he extends plato�s metaphor of memory as being birds in a cage, to ask whether chimps can make the birds in their mental aviaries fly in formation, i.e cognitively manipulate their representations
pandemonium and the colour phi phenomenon (dennett�s premise: information processing does not mimic the real time properties of experience) � verifiable by experiments on internal cognitive dissonance
awareness/attention, recall, keep track of >1 thing, which features of its own activity can it notice/monitor?
the purpose of a mind is to create future
consciousness has evolved as a means of deciding between the action that our emotional mode has put us in gear to do and the future-generated consequences-based inferential conclusions
no impression of self, therefore no idea of self (banishing substance from psychology, just as berkeley dismissed substance from physics)
also, when trying to centre on �myself�, he always stumbles on some particular perception or other � I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception
manking is nothing but a bundle or collection of diff perceptions, succeeding each other with inconceivable rapidity � in a perceptual flux and movement
berkeley � matter exists simply as idea/ideas held in mind (of man or God or any other mindful object/subject?)
physiology � body is capable of thought, that is, the phenomenon of mind is explicable in terms of / caused by matter � materialism in philosophy of mind
consider �pathetic fallacy� with regard to the body�s (as somatic marker) physiological-based emotions (weather) shedding light/shadow (giving value) to the paths carved out by our (options-generating future-calculating) reasoning in the landscape of the future, enabling us to choose and make decisions
quote nietzsche � mind & body, body & mind - inseparable
check out pinker
without our body, we would not have/be mind? (which is it?)
our mind is not indivisible
he hasn't coherently/compellingly
said what mind is
I suppose all this is somehow redundant, since there can be little doubt that the exact distinction Descartes drew between mind and body is just wrong. but the question has evolved to become �is there any way that it can be adapted, or that current or more flexible distinctions/definitions/ideas can be fitted into the rest of his metaphysics�?
this brings up the side-question of �to what extent does Descartes� system depend on his dualistic interpretation�?